



This paper maintains that Indigenous rights to access to justice 
relate to three big clusters of rights: a) non-discrimination; b) cultural 
rights; and c) self-determination. The paper argues that any attempt 
to view the issue of access to justice in relation only to one of these 
rights undermines their basis and thus, undermines them. The non-
discrimination aspect ensures that Indigenous Peoples should be 
treated equally to non-Indigenous people in their access to justice; 
the Indigenous right to culture underlines the need for some deviation 
from the national practices in judicial matters and processes; while the 
principle of self-determination is the foundation for the establishment 
of separate judicial institutions for Indigenous Peoples that will be 
designed and implemented with their active participation. 
Non-discrimination 
It must be stressed how important and far-reaching the principle of 
non-discrimination can be in seeking to improve Indigenous access 
to justice. Non-discrimination is important for two reasons: first, for 
the substantial reasons that will be discussed below; second, because 
of its binding force in international law. The international system of 
human rights perceives non-discrimination as such a fundamental 
principle that it binds states irrespective of whether they have signed 
the relevant international instruments. Moeckli confirms: “At least 
important aspects of the right to self-determination binds all states 
(…). Even more fundamentally, the right to non-discrimination on 
the basis of race, sex and religion arguably forms part of jus cogens 
according to article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
and cannot be set aside by treaty or acquiescence.”2 This can be of 
1  Reader in Law, Brunel University, UK. Alexandra.xanthaki@brunel.ac.uk 
2  Daniel Moeckli, Human Rights and Non-discrimination in the War on Terror. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) pp. 67–68. 
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substantial use to Indigenous Peoples in States that have not been very 
active in signing and ratifying the main human rights treaties, as the 
States have the obligation to ensure the implementation of such a right 
and principle. 
Therefore, in all cases access to justice must happen on an equal 
basis for Indigenous Peoples and non-Indigenous populations. The 
principle of non-discrimination prescribes that States should not create 
obstacles to Indigenous access to justice. However, international law 
goes much further than this: States must take measures to ensure that 
Indigenous Peoples have access to justice on an equal basis to non-
Indigenous Peoples. For example, States must ensure that judicial 
mechanisms are not so far away from Indigenous communities 
that it becomes unrealistic for the later to reach these mechanisms. 
It has been argued that in remote communities, access to justice is 
‘so inadequate that remote Indigenous Peoples cannot be said to 
have full civil rights’.3 Living in remote communities is an issue that 
particularly affects Indigenous Peoples. For example, in Australia, 
27% of Indigenous People live in remote or very remote communities 
compared to just 2% of the non-Indigenous population.4 Also, States 
must take measures to ensure that poverty and other lack of socio-
economic factors do not impact on Indigenous access to justice. For 
example, legal aid is a way that Indigenous Peoples among others 
obtain representation. Several non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) have noted that legal aid is currently being cut. 
Maybe most importantly, equal access to justice also means that the 
police and the judiciary act to support Indigenous Peoples rather than 
to oppose them; and are educated not to act in a prejudiced manner 
against Indigenous Peoples. This is an important element that hinders 
very often the realisation of Indigenous rights. In this respect, the 
3  Submission by The End Women’s Legal Service to the 2003 Australian Inquiry 
into Legal Aid and Access to Justice in Senate Report entitled Inquiry into Legal 
Aid and Access to Justice, (Commonwealth of Australia, 2004) p. 107, http://www.
aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Legal_and_Constitutional_
Affairs/Completed_inquiries/2002-04/legalaidjustice/report/contents, last accessed 
on 14/01/2014.  
4  Australian Government Steering Committee for the Review of Government 
Service Provision, Report on Government Services. (Canberra: SCRGSP, 2007) p. 2.
22 Alexandra Xanthaki
example of the (1978) Indian Child Welfare Act in the United States 
is rather telling: The Act was adopted initially out of concern for the 
large numbers of Indian children being separated from their families. It 
imposes a heightened evidentiary standard for terminating the parental 
rights of an Indian parent or custodian. In the 1970s, 25–35% of Indian 
children were growing up away from their families and 90% of those 
with non-Indigenous families.5 The Act was created in order to reduce 
such damning percentages. It is notable that if intent is established 
in such separations, they can be acts of genocide: according to the 
1948 Genocide Convention, genocide includes the forcible removal of 
children from one group (in this case an Indigenous group) to another 
group (non-Indigenous families) committed with intent to destroy, 
in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. 
The inclusion of the forcible removal of children from the group in 
the 1948 Genocide Convention was one of the most controversial 
paragraphs of the final version of the Convention. Such an act is more 
an act of cultural genocide, and indeed this is how it was viewed in 
the Secretariat draft,6 before being excluded from the provision of the 
Ad Hoc Committee on cultural genocide in article 2.7 Since several 
governments were opposed vigorously to the notion of “cultural 
genocide,” such a term was finally rejected; Greece subsequently 
proposed the addition of the phrase “[f]” to the list of punishable acts, 
noting that States who were opposed to cultural genocide did not 
5 Indian Child Welfare Act of 1977: Hearing on S. 1214 Before the S. Select 
Committee on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., p. 539, as mentioned in Brief of Amici 
Curiae Association of American Indian Affairs, National Congress of American 
Indians, National Indian Child Welfare Association, Indian Tribes and Other Indian 
Organisations in support of Respondents in Supreme Court of US, Adoptive Couple 





assessed on 14/01/2014. 
6  Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Secretariat and Ad Hoc Committee Draft (May 1947) Doc. E/447, article I (3) a. 
7  William Shabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes. 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000) p. 65.  
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necessarily contest “forced transfer.”8 Although it was argued during 
the drafting process that ‘no one had been able to quote any historical 
case of the destruction of a group through the transfer of children,’9 
Australia’s stolen generation, among other examples, has proved this 
statement wrong. In addition, phrases used by States such as “to kill 
the Indian in the child” verify that at least in some cases, there was 
clear intent to destroy the group. 
Although the (1978) Indian Child Welfare Act aimed at reversing 
such practices, the results were not always anticipated. Indeed, even 
though the domestic Centre for Court Innovation has explicitly noted 
that “the goals of this law will not be achieved without a commitment 
to system-wide training that reaches the front-line staff at child welfare 
agencies, the attorneys representing children and parents, individual 
judges, and tribal leadership,”10 unfortunately, this has not happened. 
Hence, the judiciary in seven US states has developed a doctrine to 
water down the power of the (1978) Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) 
by using the “Indian family doctrine” to claim that the Indian children 
are not Indian enough to apply the ICWA to them and, thus, justify and 
allow the continuation of adoption by non-Indigenous couples. 
Such practices as well as policies, which limit Indigenous rights to 
access to justice, are not just acts of discrimination; it is argued that they 
constitute institutional racism. In the United Kingdom, the MacPherson 
Report has defined institutionalised racism as follows: “The collective 
failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional 
service to people because of their colour, culture or ethnic origin.”11 This 
definition reflects the situation that most Indigenous Peoples currently 
face around the world. Institutional racism often creates alienation from 
8  Ibid, p. 175.
9  Ibid. 
10  Justine van Straaten and Paul G Buchbinder, Paper on The Indian Child 
Welfare Act Improving Compliance through State-Tribal Coordination published 
by the Centre for Court Innovation (2011) in http://www.courtinnovation.org/
research/indian-child-welfare-act-improving-compliance-through-state-tribal-
coordination, last accessed on 14/01/2014, p. 12.  
11  UK Home Office, The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: Report of an Inquiry by 
Sir William Macpherson of Cluny, Cm 4262-I, February 1999, para 6.34. The 
report can be accessed at http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/
cm42/4262/sli-06.htm#6.34. 
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the State and fear of the State. The legacy of colonialism, the on-going 
marginalisation, disempowerment and on-going discrimination often 
result in Indigenous opposition to any intervention from the police 
or other public bodies to situations involving Indigenous individuals. 
Many Indigenous persons prefer to stay away from all State agencies 
and public bodies and challenge their usefulness. A recent Australian 
study has confirmed that Indigenous resistance and reaction to 
discrimination often results in the criminalisation of the Indigenous 
person discriminated against. And it would be inaccurate to focus only 
on the judiciary or only on the enforcement bodies and their attitudes. 
In Malaysia, although Indigenous Peoples have won land cases, the 
legislature refuses to acknowledge the decisions and change the laws; 
and/or the government does not implement the decisions of the courts. 
States must educate their public servants about Indigenous cultures, 
realities and needs. Otherwise, they clearly are failing their obligations 
under international law. 
Often, the main argument given against additional protection 
designed to ensure non-discrimination against Indigenous Peoples in 
access to justice relates to an ill-perceived principle of equal treatment. 
States argue that they do not wish to implement any additional rights 
for Indigenous Peoples, because they wish to treat all individuals 
living within their territory in the same way. This however, is not 
in accordance with standards of international law. Article 26 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) requires 
effective protection against discrimination. Both General Comment 
18 of the Human Rights Committee and General Recommendation 
14 of the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) specify that that “differentiation of treatment 
will not constitute discrimination if the criteria for such differentiation, 
judged against the objectives and purposes of the Convention, are 
legitimate.”12 Therefore, specific measures such as providing all State 
documents in the Indigenous languages so that Indigenous individuals 
can be sufficiently informed are paramount. Yet, it has been reported 
12  UNHCHR Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, Prevention of Racial Discrimination, including Early Warning and 
Urgent Procedures: working paper adopted by the Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination, 48th Sess., A/48/18 (1996) chapter VIII B.
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that the Orang Asli in Malaysia would file a case for their land rights 
but they could not really follow the proceedings as they had no 
translators. Hence, their right to remedy is seriously hindered by the 
lack of access to the judicial proceedings. 
I outline below a number of points supporting positive protection 
of Indigenous Peoples in promoting their access to justice:
First, States have the responsibility to take positive measures. 
States do not have discretion as to the decision to take measures: they 
do not have the right, but the responsibility to take positive measures. 
Of special interest is the comment of CERD about the opinion of the 
United States that special measures are “allowed,” but not required. 
CERD’s response was:
“With regard to affirmative action, the Committee notes 
with concern the position taken by the State party that the 
provisions of the Convention permit, but do not require 
States parties to adopt affirmative action measures to ensure 
the adequate development and protection of certain racial, 
ethnic or national groups. The Committee emphasizes that 
the adoption of special measures by States parties when the 
circumstances so warrant, such as in the case of persistent 
disparities, is an obligation stemming from article 2, para-
graph 2, of the Convention.”13
The Committee has repeatedly linked Indigenous access to justice 
with the non-discrimination principle: in August 2012, CERD referred 
to Ecuador’s attempts to take measures to ensure Indigenous access 
to justice. CERD has recently also referred to problems in federal 
States’ policies in Indigenous access to justice when commenting on 
Canada’s report. The Committee said that although Canada may have 
taken positive measures, the practices at the provincial and territorial 
state levels differ.
Secondly, a distinction has been drawn by CERD “between special 
and temporary measures for the advancement of ethnic groups on the 
one hand and permanent rights of Indigenous Peoples on the other 
13  CERD, Concluding Observations of CERD: United States of America, 59th 
Sess., CERD/C/304/Add.125 (2001). 
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hand.”14 General Recommendation 32 (2009) consolidates the practice 
of CERD in distinguishing permanent rights from special measures: 
“Special measures should not be confused with specific 
rights pertaining to certain categories of person or commu-
nity, such as…the rights of Indigenous Peoples. (…) The 
distinction between special measures and permanent rights 
implies that those entitled to permanent rights may also 
enjoy the benefits of special measures.”15
The recommendation also states that “special measures should 
clearly benefit groups and individuals in their enjoyment of human 
rights”16 as well as suggesting that States parties “should ensure that 
special measures are designed and implemented on the basis of prior 
consultations with affected communities and the active participation 
of such communities”17—a provision that assists communities in 
securing genuine benefit from the measures in terms that they under-
stand and accept. 
Cultural Rights 
In addition to the principle of non-discrimination, Indigenous 
rights to access relates to Indigenous cultural rights. I have analysed 
Indigenous cultural rights elsewhere;18 here, I wish to stress that the 
rights of Indigenous Peoples to culture must be taken into account 
both when the national system of justice is reviewed and assessed and 
14  CERD, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 9 
of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination, 70th Sess., CERD/C/NZL/CO/17, (2007) para. 15.
15  CERD, The Meaning and Scope of Special Measures in the International 
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 75th Sess., CERD/C/75/
Misc.7/Rev.2 (2009) para. 15. 
16  Ibid para. 33.
17  Ibid para. 18.
18  Alexandra Xanthaki, Indigenous Cultural Rights in M Weller and J Hoffman 
eds., Oxford Commentaries on International Law—The Rights of Minorities: 
A Commentary on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). (forthcoming); also see Elsa 
Stamatopoulou, Monitoring Cultural Human Rights: The Claims of Culture on 
Human Rights and the Response of Cultural Rights (2012) 34 Human Rights 
Quarterly. p.1172.
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when separate Indigenous judicial systems are established. Indigenous 
Peoples’ understanding of their rights, including access to justice, is 
often informed by their unique outlooks on, and practices associated 
with, justice. These may in some respects differ from dominant 
approaches to justice. It has been argued in the literature that the 
following Indigenous judicial customs and practices work well and 
have positive results in the community: 
• Indigenous sentencing courts, including circle courts;
• Indigenous community-based structures and bodies; 
• Indigenous community-based family violence programs;
• Indigenous night patrols and other community-initiated 
policing strategies;
• Indigenous mentoring programs; 
• Indigenous community-based alternatives to prison; 
• Correctional programs delivered by Indigenous community 
members and
• Cultural immersion programs within prisons.19
Notwithstanding which specific measures will be chosen in 
each region and each precise time, the specific characteristics of 
Indigenous Peoples must be taken into consideration in the design of 
justice systems.20 It is those States with quality processes for ongoing 
engagement with Indigenous communities that have been developing 
effective criminal justice policies. For example, the American Bar 
Association’s Centre on Children and Law found that “talks and/
or agreements between neighbouring state and tribal governments 
frequently fail because there had been inattention to the history, 
cultural considerations, and important political or fiscal realities that 
form an ever-present context for tribal/state co-existence.”21
19  See Fiona Alison and Chris Cuneen, The role of Indigenous Justice Agreements 
in improving social and legal outcomes for Indigenous people, (2010) 32 Sydney 
Law Review. p. 666. 
20  CERD, Report of the Committee of the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: 
Namibia, Sess., 72–73. CERDA/63/18 (2009) para. 305.
21  Stanley Feldman and David Withey, “Resolving State-Tribal Jurisdictional 
Dilemmas” (1995) 79 Judicature. p. 156.
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A positive example in this respect has been the Indigenous Justice 
Agreements (IJAs) in Australia. These agreements were put in place 
after the 1997 Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody 
and have been agreed between the government and Indigenous bodies 
in New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria and Western Australia. 
They constitute significant strategic frameworks, intended to address 
Indigenous over-representation in the criminal justice system through 
improved delivery of justice programs to Indigenous communities 
with an emphasis upon Indigenous self-determination.22 They address 
several important Indigenous concerns, including “social, economic, 
and cultural issues; justice issues; customary law; law reform; and 
government funding levels for programs.”23 Measures agreed upon 
vary from specific targets for reducing the rate of Indigenous over-
representation in the criminal justice system to specific methods of 
service delivery and include monitoring and evaluation. The agreements 
form a refreshing set of initiatives in a period that saw more punitive 
approaches to law being favoured and also reluctance towards any 
reform to the justice system or recognition of Indigenous rights in 
this respect. According to Alison and Cuneen, these agreements have 
been effective to a large degree and have improved the accountability 
of State bodies initiating independent monitoring and evaluation.24 
In addition, Indigenous communities have actively participated in 
the design and implementation of these agreements: “Indigenous 
community engagement, self-management and ownership where 
they have set up effective and well-coordinated community-based 
justice structures and/or led to the development of localised strategic 
planning, as well as through encouraging initiatives that embody such 
ideals.”25
Caneen emphasises that such agreements show that “Indigenous 
demands are more likely to be met by a transformation in the justice 
system that allows the development of a hybrid system where 
22  See supra note 18. 
23  Ibid. 
24  Ibid. 
25  Ibid. 
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traditional legal bureaucratic forms of justice are combined with 
elements of informal justice and Indigenous justice.”26 
Indigenous Customary Laws and Systems 
The right of Indigenous Peoples to maintain their customary 
laws and systems is a rather unexplored issue in the literature, even 
though it is a recognised right by the UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples (UN Declaration). Article 34 recognises the 
right of Indigenous Peoples to promote, develop and maintain their 
institutional structures and juridical systems. Although the text includes 
the limiting clause “in the cases where they exist,” it is still a major 
success for Indigenous Peoples. This was especially evident during 
the elaboration of the UN Declaration, where States were reluctant 
to accept the use of the phrase “Indigenous laws” and “Indigenous 
juridical systems.” This was partly because of the wide belief that law 
is at the core of the State mechanism. However, this idea—albeit true 
in many respects—does not fully cover the realities of today’s States. 
In the interpretative statements delivered after the adoption of the 
Declaration, Australia objected to the position of Indigenous custom-
ary law above the national law. The Australian delegate stated: 
“Customary law is not law in the sense that modern democ-
racies use the term; it is based on culture and traditions. It 
should not override national laws and should not be used 
selectively to permit the exercise of practices by certain 
Indigenous communities that would be unacceptable in the 
rest of the community.”27 
This statement deviates from current standards of international law, 
as the “processes of promoting and protecting human rights should 
be conducted in conformity with the purposes and principles of the 
26  Chris Caneen, Criminology, Criminal Justice and Indigenous People: A 
Dysfunctional Relationship? (2009) 20 Current Issues Criminal Justice. pp. 
323–336 & 335. 
27  UNHRC, Submission: Universal Periodic Review of Canada, 61st Sess., UN 
Doc. A/61/PV.107 (2007) p. 12. 
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Charter of the United Nations and international law.”28 As confirmed 
by the International Court of Justice, “the fundamental principle of 
international law [is] that it prevails over domestic law.”29 In this 
respect, making the rights recognised by the UN Declaration subject 
to national law would not make sense.
The definition of what exactly customary laws are is important in 
guiding the specific customs that will be used in justice systems. In 
a paper in 2013 on glossary of relevant terms, the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) used Black’s Law Dictionary 
which defines “customary law” as law “consisting of customs that 
are accepted as legal requirements or obligatory rules of conduct; 
practices and beliefs that are so vital and intrinsic a part of a social 
and economic system that they are treated as if they were laws.”30 
Customary law was also defined as “locally recognized principles, and 
more specific norms or rules, which are orally held and transmitted, 
and applied by community institutions to internally govern or guide 
all aspects of life.”31
Svensson has noted: 
“Customary law is, moreover, a complex concept; it refers to 
ecological, political, legal as well as cultural aspects, and it 
is constituted by a combination of certain customs and a set 
of legal perceptions people in a specific culture may have. It 
is the customs that are law generating which are of interest, 
not customs as such. As a working definition, customary 
28  Human rights and international solidarity, UN Commission on Human Rights 
Res. 2005/55,61st session, UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES.2005/55 (2005) Preamble. 
[emphasis added]; See also UNHRC, Urgent Need to Improve the U.N. Standard-
Setting Process and Importance of Criteria of ‘Consistent with International Law 
and its Progressive Development’, 62nd Sess., UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/WG.15/
CRP.3 (2005).
29  ICJ, Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United 
Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, Advisory Opinion, (26 April 
1988)  I.C.J. 12, para. 57.
30  WIPO, Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic 
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, Glossary of Key Terms related 
to Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and 
Traditional Cultural Expressions, 25th Sess., UN Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/25/INF/7 
(2013) annex, pp. 8–9. 
31  Ibid. 
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law will be conceived as traditional knowledge-based rules. 
In my view, customary law discourse has a two-dimensional 
feature: first it is a matter of political strategy of actions; 
second it has to do with the management of traditional, 
locally anchored knowledge.” 32
The above definitions reveal some characteristics that customary 
laws may include:
• They must be more than mere customs. Rather, Indigenous 
customary laws are “complex systems of rules and practices 
which may have legal and juridical effect.”33
• They can be oral or written; codified or not. As customary laws 
are closely tied to ethical, cultural and spiritual principles, their 
application does not necessarily follow the logic of positive 
law and attempts to codify or assimilate customary law into 
the positive law system may lead to changes in its nature and 
the loss of its underlying principles, nature and dynamism.
• However, they have to be viewed by the community as having 
binding effect, rather than simply describing actual practices.
• They may concern different aspects of community life; for 
example, they can relate to natural resources or inheritance, 
cultural and spiritual behaviour, etc.
• In addition, Indigenous customary laws are not static, in the 
same manner that tradition and culture are not static. They 
evolve and adapt to the social and economic changes. 
• Finally, some will be “formally” recognized by and/or linked to 
the national legal systems of the country in which a community 
resides. 
Scholars in the field of legal pluralism have written extensively 
about issues of justice, property rights, religion, natural resources 
and human rights. They have investigated the relationship between 
customary law and State law and debated the impact of transnational 
law. Indeed, discussions around Indigenous customary law have 
32  Tom Svensson, On customary law: Inquiry into an Indigenous Rights Issue, 
(2003) 2 Acta Borealia. p.95.  
33  Supra note 29, at annex, pp.8–9. 
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taken place before, just not within the remit of Indigenous rights and 
international law. For example, a lot of relevant discussion took place 
in Africa in the 1960s about the recognition of Indigenous customary 
law.34 The colonial States recognized legal pluralism at the time 
only as a set of rules dependent on the colonial States’ structures. 
The materials the State officials drew at the time “was mainly the 
interpretation of Western-educated lawyers on Indigenous law that 
would then be applied in practice by Western-style law courts and 
second, that it gave legal validity and permanence to the views of old 
tribal leaders and stifled progress.”35 Twining rightly criticises such an 
approach; according to him, legal pluralism is the co-existence of two 
or more legal orders in the same time-space context.36 He continues: 
“It is gradually accepted that a conception of law confined to state law 
(…) leaves out too many significant phenomena deserving sustained 
juridical attention.”37 
However, although practice worldwide has accepted sub-national 
juridical systems, international law has not followed. Today, there 
is still no explicit recognition of the right of sub-national groups to 
their customary laws and systems. Certainly the rights of Indigenous 
Peoples to their customary laws and systems seem to be more explicitly 
accepted than the rights of minorities. In specific, the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities urges States “to create favourable conditions to 
enable persons belonging to minorities to express their characteristics 
and to develop their culture (…) traditions and customs” but makes 
minorities’ customs dependent on national law. ILO Convention No. 
107 also makes the retention of Indigenous customs dependent on 
national law. Article 4.2 of ILO Convention No. 107 maintains that 
“due account shall be taken of the cultural and religious values and 
34  Kaius Tuori, Legal Pluralism and Modernisation: American Law professors in 
Ethiopia and the downfall of the reinstatements of African Customary Law (2010) 
62 Journal of Legal Pluralism.; also see William Twining, The restatement of African 
customary law: A Comment (1963) 3 Journal of Modern African Law. p.221. 
35  Ibid.  
36  William Twining, Legal Pluralism 101. (UCL and University of Miami Law 
School, 2010), http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/academics/profiles/twining/Legal_
Pluralism_101_2010.pdf  
37  Ibid. 
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of the forms of social control existing among these populations;” and 
article 7.1 maintains that “regard shall be had to their customary laws;” 
and article 7.2 allows Indigenous Peoples to “retain their own customs 
and institutions” but only where these are not incompatible with the 
national legal system or the objectives of integration programmes. In 
addition, article 8 proclaims that “to the extent consistent with the 
interests of the national community and the national legal system,” 
the methods of social control and the Indigenous customs in regard to 
penal matters are to be respected. In other words, although articles 7 
and 8 recognise Indigenous customary laws, the language used and its 
qualifications act as a double sword. The requirement of compatibility 
of Indigenous customs and institutions with non-Indigenous ones does 
not stand well in today’s vision of Indigenous rights. Although the 
convention is now closed for ratification, it is still in force in 18 States, 
some with significant Indigenous populations. All provisions above 
are currently interpreted by the ILO bodies within the spirit of ILO 
Convention No. 169, the UN Declaration and general international 
law standards, without the limitations that were intended at the time 
of the drafting of the Convention. Hence, the ILO Convention No. 
107 should not be quickly discarded, as it still offers protection of 
Indigenous cultural rights. For example, recently, the ILO Committee 
of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
(CEARC) asked Iraq to provide information about measures that take 
Indigenous customary laws and their methods of social control into 
account,38 while El Salvador was asked to provide more information 
about the effect of the Cultural Development Policy on the cultural 
heritage of Indigenous Peoples.39 
ILO Convention No. 169 is more forthcoming in its protection of 
Indigenous cultural rights. Article 2(1) ensures that States must take 
action to promote the full realization of Indigenous cultural rights “with 
respect for their social and cultural identity, their customs and traditions 
and their institutions.” The Convention asks States to take special 
measures to “safeguard” the cultures of Indigenous Peoples (art. 4). The 
38  CEARC, 102nd ILC Sess., Direct Request (CEARC)- Indigenous and Tribal 
Populations Convention, 1957 (No. 107)- Iraq (2012)  
39  CEARC, 101st ILC Sess., Direct Request (CEARC)- Indigenous and Tribal 
Populations Convention, 1957 (No. 107)- El Salvador (2011). 
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“social, cultural, religious and spiritual values and practices of these 
Peoples shall be recognised and protected” according to article 5 of the 
ILO Convention No. 169 and “due account shall be taken of the nature 
of the problems which face them both as groups and as individuals.” 
More specifically, the Convention requires that the “integrity of the 
values, practices and institutions” of Indigenous Peoples “shall be 
respected” (article 5b). Article 8 of the ILO Convention No. 169 
requires States to give due regard to the customs or customary laws of 
Indigenous Peoples, when applying national laws and regulations. The 
ILO has explained that the criteria of article 8(1) are cumulative, in other 
words Indigenous customs can be restricted only when incompatible 
both with the national legislation and the international human rights 
standards.40 Article 9 asks for respect of the Indigenous methods that 
deal with offenses and customs with respect to penal matters. The 
ILO monitoring mechanisms have discussed on several occasions the 
obligations that derive from the above provisions, especially related 
to customary laws and sanctions. In 2012, the CEARC asked Fiji to 
indicate areas where there is “an interaction between customary law 
and written law of the country and how the judiciary has dealt with 
cases of such nature, by providing copies of court decisions.”41
Indigenous communities have been disappointed that the Convention 
does not view Indigenous cultural rights under the framework of self-
determination; this though should not detract from the effectiveness 
of the instrument. Indeed, the Convention has been used by several 
national courts on cases related to customary rights. For example, 
the Constitutional Court in Bolivia used the ILO Convention No. 
169 provisions on cultural rights regarding sanctions imposed by an 
Indigenous community to its members and recognized the Indigenous 
sanctions, even though it said this was not an absolute right and 
was limited by constitutional requirements and human rights law.42 
40  ILO, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Rights in Practice, A Guide to ILO Conven-
tion No. 169. (Geneva: International Labour Standards Department, 2009) p. 82.
41  CEARC, 102st ILC Sess., Direct Request (CEARC)- C169- Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169) Fiji, (2012). 
42  Constitutional Court of Argentina, Constitutional Judgment 0295/2003-R, File 
2002-04940-10-RAC,
Judgment of 11 March, 2003. 
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Similarly, the Constitutional Court of Colombia also used article 8 to 
hold that the decisions of Indigenous communities that apply sanctions 
in accordance with Indigenous customary community law constitute 
valid decisions within their jurisdiction, unless they contravene the 
Constitutional guarantees for fundamental rights.43 Although these 
decisions are great and their limitation of Indigenous laws before 
constitutional provisions go further than ILO Conventions No. 107 
and No. 169, they were held before adoption of the UN Declaration 
in 2007 (2003 and 1994 respectively) and hence do not incorporate 
the evolution that the UN Declaration has represented in Indigenous 
customary laws. Article 34 of the UN Declaration embodies the right 
to self-determination as expressed in the Preamble and articles 3, 4 
and 5 of the Declaration. Here the right to cultural autonomy is not 
separated from the right to self-determination as opposed, for example, 
to articles 1 and 27 of the ICCPR, which separate self-determination 
and cultural autonomy respectively. Conversely article 34 of the UN 
Declaration draws together self-determination and cultural autonomy. 
Finally, one should not forget the important contribution of the 
Inter-American system of human rights protection in defending 
and promoting Indigenous rights. In the Aloeboetoe case, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights considered the marriage customs 
of the Saramaca people in apportioning compensation to the victims’ 
next of kin and took into account the customary marriage practices 
of the Saramacan people in its decision as to who qualified as family 
members who would be awarded reparations.44 The Inter-American 
Court also ordered reparations to reinforce the cultural traditions and 
customary law of the Achí Mayan Peoples when their culture was 
almost destroyed through human rights violations. 
43  Constitutional Court of Colombia, Judgment T-254/94, Judgment of 30 May, 
1994 (Rapporteur: Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz). 




Still, the maintenance of multiple legal systems within the State 
brings with it some challenges that have to be discussed: 
1. Conflicts with other human rights 
Many States are very reluctant to allow for Indigenous alternative 
judicial arrangements. They often use the argument of potential 
discriminatory outcomes or processes that such arrangements may 
have. For example, the Australian report on Customary Law states that 
customary law may mean control of the judicial processes by male 
elders who were themselves or family members were perpetrators of 
crimes.45 
UN bodies have also expressed their concern. The Committee 
on the Rights of the Child has expressed its concern for on-going 
discrimination against Indigenous children that touches all aspects 
of life, including cultural rights;46 and customary laws and cultural 
practices that have a detrimental effect on Indigenous children and 
especially girls.47 Similar comments have also been issued by the 
Committee of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW), especially with respect to Indigenous 
cultural practices that have a negative effect on Indigenous women.48
Article 1 of the UN Declaration confirms that the instrument is not 
to be examined on its own, but is part of the whole international human 
rights edifice. In addition, article 46.2 is a general clause recognising 
that the Declaration is subject to limitations “interpreted in accordance 
45  Northern Territory Law Reform Committee, Report of the Committee of 
Enquiry, Report on Aboriginal Customary Law. (Darwin: NTLRC, 2003) p. 15. 
46  Committee on the Rights of the Child, Consideration of the reports submitted 
by States parties under article 44 of the Convention: Concluding observations 
Union of Myanmar, 59th Sess., UN Doc. CRC/C/MMR/CO/3-4 (2012), para. 96.  
47  CRC, Concluding observations on the consolidated second and third report of 
Namibia, 61st Sess., UN Doc. CRC/C/NAM/CO/3-4 (2012) para. 30 (a) & (b); also 
supra note 45. 
48  For example, CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination of Women, Mexico, 52nd Sess., CEDAW/C/MEX/
CO/7-8 (2012) paras. 34–35; CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination of Women, Paraguay, 50th Sess., CEDAW/C/
PRY/CO/6 (2012) para. 32.  
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with the principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, 
equality, non-discrimination, good governance and good faith,”49 which 
are values that are common for the whole humanity. They include the 
principle of non-derogation of some rights, such as the right to life 
and prohibition of torture; and also include the core of human rights, 
the essence of each human right. Indigenous leaders have recognised 
repeatedly that no cultural practices and beliefs can violate these values 
and no real adjustment can be initiated to these rights. Understanding 
the UN Declaration as part of international law, as noted in articles 1 
and 46, provides some directions about these cases. 
The recognition of Indigenous laws and systems does not endanger 
human rights any more than the recognition of non-Indigenous or 
national customs. International law is open to the cultural allegiances 
that the individual has and views them as concentric circles around 
the person. All circles are protected as they all contribute to the 
enrichment and development of the individual. This model emphasises 
the commonality of values and ideas of different cultural frameworks, 
including Indigenous and non-Indigenous cultures. Revisibility and 
re-evaluation of specific expressions of cultures occur in all cultures, 
including the Indigenous ones, and must prima facie come from the 
group itself. Also, any assessment about a cultural practice must allow 
for a certain deference for the group’s “own interpretive and decision-
making processes in the application of universal human rights 
norms, just as States are accorded such deference.”50 Therefore, no 
preconceived hierarchy between the Indigenous right to custom and 
any other right is desirable and can be concluded by applying the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Even when a custom 
violates a non-derogable right or the core of another right, a solution 
that would accommodate both rights must be found. However, at the 
very last instance, the custom that violates the core of another right 
49  United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 13 September 
2007, GA Res. 61/295 (Annex), UN GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 49, Vol. III, UN 
Doc. A/61/49, article 46. 
50  James Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples. (Aspen CO: 
Aspen Publishers, 2009) p. 26.
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cannot continue.51 This is how articles 12–14 in conjunction with 
articles 1 and 46.2 of the UN Declaration must be read. 
2. Hierarchy of systems 
For example, in Malaysia the traditional institutions are often 
undermined by the State or hybrid systems. These bodies are often 
established to represent Indigenous communities but gradually become 
the oppressor themselves as they are seen to represent the views of 
Indigenous Peoples even though their Indigenous composition is very 
limited. Therefore, Indigenous Peoples have noted that in ‘there is a 
need for a re-definition of the relationship between Indigenous Peoples 
and the State through effective negotiation processes’.52
Also in Africa, the colonial State legal pluralism recognized 
Indigenous law only as a set of rules, while the contemporary idea 
of deep legal pluralism attempts to take into account Indigenous law 
but considers its existence independent of state structures. So, it is an 
often committed mistake that the interpretation of Indigenous laws 
and systems relies on Western-educated lawyers that would then be 
applied in practice by Western-style law courts. Also, the choice of 
who will be chosen to give his or her opinion on the Indigenous laws 
is usually made on the basis of convenience of the State rather than 
knowledge. In this issue, positive has been the new Administration 
of Justice Act for Greenland and a new Criminal Code for Greenland 
which entered into force in January 2010. District courts maintain a 
local presence and staff and district judges are recruited among the 
local population.
3. Interpretation of Indigenous laws and systems—Capacity building
51  Alexandra Xanthaki, Multiculturalism and International Law: Discussing 
Universal Standards, (2010) 32 Human Rights Quarterly. 
52  Indigenous Governance systems in Asia, Submission by the Asia Indigenous 
Peoples’ Pact (AIPP) Foundation to the Study by the Expert Mechanism on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples entitled Indigenous Peoples and the Right to 
Participate in Decision-Making, 3d session (2010) of the Expert Mechanism on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, 
found in http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/Indigenous /ExpertMechanism/3rd/
docs/contributions/AIPP.doc  
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The other major challenge to the Indigenous political systems 
is the building of the capacity of these institutions to address more 
effectively the more complex present-day realities and situations 
of Indigenous Peoples. For example, Indigenous institutions are 
increasingly confronted by outside entities such as corporations, 
international financial institutions promoting “development projects” 
that severely limit the rights of Indigenous communities and more 
often than not entail the extraction or expropriation of Indigenous lands 
and resources. In Malaysia, hybrid organisations such as the Village 
Security and Development Committees (JKKK) are seen as tools of 
the government to dominate and control the Indigenous Peoples or as 
organisations that act as ‘the ears and eyes’ of the government.53
Who will decide whether the Indigenous structure, custom and 
right is in conflict with international human rights and on what basis?54 
Suffice to say that first, the individual whose rights are in question 
must be the initial point of reference; second, that the group must be 
allowed to exercise its own rules of interpretive and decision-making 
processes in the application of universal human rights norms;55 and 
third, that conflicts between international human rights and Indigenous 
rights would put in motion the Lovelace test of proportionality, 
necessity, equity and balance of rights.56 
Also, there is a need for Indigenous experts to give their 
expertise on Indigenous laws. For example, in Palau “the courts are 
increasingly viewed as becoming a part of customary processes of 
dispute resolution, while the inclusion of chiefs in legislature and state 
government bodies is seen as forging a compromise between western 
and customary models of governance.”57 This notion of compromise 
is also apparent in the Loyalty Islands Environment Charter, “which 
53  Ibid. 
54  James Anaya, Indigenous  Peoples in International Law. (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2004) 133. 
55  Supra note 50, at p. 26.  
56  Lovelace v. Ontario, 2000 (1) S.C.R 950 (SCC 37).
57  Brendan Tobin, The Role of Customary Law in Access and Benefit-sharing and 
Traditional Knowledge Governance: Perspectives from Andean and Pacific Island 
Countries. (Switzerland: WIPO & UNU, 2013) pp.1–97.
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seeks to articulate customary law principles in a fashion coherent to a 
western legal system.”58 
Other questions that have to be addressed include more depth in 
the relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous systems of 
law and how they can interact with mutual respect but also efficiency; 
whether the Indigenous customary laws will also bind non-Indigenous 
Peoples that are in Indigenous areas or not; and what form of 
recognition the Indigenous customary laws may take. 
Notwithstanding all the challenges and also the need for further 
reflection on customary international laws and systems, one cannot deny 
that important steps have been made. Certainly, the implementation of 
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples will push for 
further reflection and discussion on such matters. 
58  Ibid. 
